death strategy
JORGE M. 15/03/2009 REVERTE
has been discussed almost everything. But maybe, when you meet 70 years after the Civil War's end, one aspect less treated as the purely military. A strike that became a long game of chess. A republican army fought better than expected. The author has investigated for years for his next book. This is your exclusive story, accompanied by photos unknown.
Copy of The Country
The April 1, 1939, General Franco announced the end of the war which he started, along with other soldiers, in July 1936. The statement did not mean winning the arrival of peace. A bleeding caused by three years of armed conflict were to follow him tens of thousands of executions committed by military courts no guarantees for the accused. The Civil War began as a coup, later became a confrontation between two great armies and ended with a wide slaughter.
all started when a fraction, the principal officers of the English army was agreed to strike a blow that would end the democratic state led by Manuel ana. That
military action that the conspirators thought complete in a few weeks with a clean would cost tens of thousands of people failed in its infancy. And this caused some disruption in the ranks coup that made a temporary alliance territories. Dead its natural leader, General Sanjurjo, at first, General Emilio Mola was as king of the north, while Gonzalo Queipo de Llano was the South. A third general, Francisco Franco, ruled over settled African forces in Ceuta and Melilla and the rest of the Moroccan protectorate. And that affected the way they implemented their first military career. While
Queipo de Llano was engaged in pacifying their territory police techniques, Mola and Franco agreed that the main strategic line of his plan was the conquest of Madrid. Each lashed out in his own way: Franco, from the south, ignored and evaded previous plans for approaching Despeñaperros African capital with its columns via Badajoz. Mola, who understood very soon the weak structure of Republican resistance in the north, due to the indecision of the Basque nationalists on their role in the conflict, took that occasion to attain one of the most important strategic victories of the rebels at all war: the isolation of Republican north the French border. He did so with little effort. But at the same time, their militias began requetés and garrison soldiers on Madrid. In the northern highlands fascist militias stopped him. A Franco, no, because his army was the only preparation for war, much the same style was primitive, typical of a colonial conflict. In places like Galicia and Asturias, local plans finalized rebels gradually connected with the largest contingents of Mola in Castilla y León, Aragón and Navarra. On the other side
loyal, the disarray that followed the failed coup was even greater. The army disappeared in a few days, and a barrage of multicolored militias took to the roads without any military planning effort. In the first weeks, the most militant activists who had volunteered to end the rebellion were killed by the hundreds to the passage of Legionnaires and regular, to take them out of the way using tactics involvement and unsophisticated weapons. The professional army that had remained loyal to the Republic were systematically disobeyed, tried many times by assemblies of soldiers and, in some cases, shot on the spot if the men under his command felt they had not fulfilled its duties effectively, that is, if they decided that they were traitors. In each area there was a different resistance phenomenon according to local political circumstances: the Catalan militia of the CNT, which had disdained to be with the political direction of Catalonia, struggled on his own with the intention of making revolution at home and export Aragon; Communists mounted their units considering the defense of the Republic of the Popular Front. The Socialists, as well, although with less efficiency.
During the first two months of the conflict, there was no clear direction of war on either side. Not even on the rebel side, where generals agreed on the basis of its strength and accomplishments. Franco, who was soon recognized as the most effective, managed to win, beating by hand Mola authority gave its near impunity advance on Madrid. With that and with the trump card of support from Hitler and Mussolini.
rebel General Franco was the first to achieve unity of action. His decision to release the palace policy Toledo contributed to the delay of the capture of Madrid, but assured the undisputed leadership of his movement. On 1 October he was appointed head of the state government to be built when the coup succeed.
Shortly after these dates, the socialist Francisco Largo Caballero got what he had until now seemed impossible: to create a Popular Front government were represented in almost all political and union advocates of the Republic. One of the first, if not the first tasks of this government was to launch a new military structure that was capable of defending the legal system. The time lost was Largo and his government to consider Madrid could not defend, because there was no time to implement effectively the new units fitted in mixed brigades were formed in Levante and La Mancha, and awaited the arrival of the weapons provided by the Soviet Union. Anarchists and communists
accepted, for better or worse grade, in the Council of Ministers decision of Largo: Madrid was left with a Defence Council headed by General Miaja and effective defense lines would be located on the banks of the Tagus .
However, when the battle of Madrid began, was produced within the Republic's first disobedience important: with the support of the Soviets, the Communists decided to he had to defend Madrid, despite the orders of Largo Caballero. The first brigade mixed with some operational capability, the command of Enrique Lister, appeared in the south of the city the day before the assault began. The international brigades did two days later. Long had to swallow the breach of his authority. Anarchists responded by moving their units, the army of Cipriano Mera, who was in La Mancha, Guadalajara, and the Durruti column, brought from the Aragon front in an initiative that took the government to challenge the hegemony of the communist military in front of the capital. General Sebastian Pozas, and direct subordinate Colonel Married Sigismund, in charge of the central area, had to endure the humiliation of seeing Madrid defended himself, and stick to the new circumstances.
Madrid was the last combat phase of the coup. It was an epic battle filled with images of heroism and condensation of the universal struggle between fascism and anti-fascism. But it remained a battle dominated by more primitive features. The use of aircraft and tanks had limited relevance to the side of the machine guns, artillery and infantry assaults on the body clean. While the soldiers were facing the Moorish mercenaries and legionnaires, men dressed as the army of Pancho Villa assassinated right-wing, without trial. Throughout Spain, a murderous fever spread. On one side, killing priests and nuns, shopkeepers and retired military personnel because the State had gone Democratic, the other, day laborers, teachers, poets and loyal military men, because the rebels wanted to build a new state nacionalcatólico.
assault
The failure of Franco in Madrid was followed by the first battle of some entity in the open: the Jarama. At that time, Franco was able to move units and divisions falling under significant mass use of artillery. His military authorities at that time was indisputable. The Republic could answer on the offensive with its new brigades, although lack of sufficient training and materiel. Best result obtained from the remittances of Soviet fighters to strike a balance in the air, which was favorable from the beginning, thanks to the German and Italian aid to the rebels. The Russian tanks, but poorly used by lack of experience of controls, had an important role in the outcome. A paper that was downgraded by the effectiveness of German anti-tank weapons.
That battle ended in a draw. It was a drain and left the two exhausted armies.
The following quote was in Guadalajara. A battle in which the CTV, the Italian expeditionary force, was a severe correction. His 40,000 men well armed, fed and clothed, were unable to break the Republican lines. And there are indications that Franco was not sorry that defeat came about. The Italian military had very explicit political direction of making war on their own, that is, to win for the Duce. Since I landed, without asking permission from his allies, in Cadiz during the month of December, Franco was unable to impose its authority over an army that was necessary to achieve victory, but could at any time, if he achieved hegemony in their side, very serious conditions impose on the political future of Spain. The action of Guadalajara was to take Madrid and sign a first-class propaganda both. In Franco's headquarters came to toast the result that had humiliated the fascist ally. In the Republicans are provided by the effectiveness of a man who had been instrumental in saving Madrid and now, had defeated the enemy in open field, Colonel Vicente Rojo. Established
authority, Franco never again suffer any setback that put into question the uniqueness of his command, though he had to impose by force their view of things that caused the crisis between the Falange and the Carlist to achieve necessary political unity, the party unique new state Ramon Serrano Suner designed for you. In the spring of 1937, Franco had become lord and master politician of the territories in his possession. The autonomy of the German Condor Legion did not threaten his leadership, because it only affected the way we use the units in combat.
was thereafter when he could exercise with all the force its military authority. He decided to end the northern front. Until then moved most of the Italian units and effective German artillery and air strikes, and began a bitter battle that enabled him to get, week after week, slowly and progressively, with the whole of the Cantabrian in the hands of the Republic.
This shift was decisive, although it required to set aside the first objective: Madrid. If he had taken the capital, would have overwhelmed its popularity. But his staff considered the almost impossible.
is arguable that the decision was wrong, but from the military standpoint, and with the possibility that the British policy of non-intervention could change, the liquidation of the northern front had many advantages for his side, with its conquest It would then control the mining areas and heavy industry, and allow him to unite their forces in one area, without having to back an army of 100,000 men from nearly all working-class areas with a high level of awareness. Although the Duke of Alba and other agents will be broadcasting from London, Paris and Rome assurances to the contrary, was not ruled out that there could be changes in the international political balance. And if British policy varied, and Franco had no power to influence it, blocking the Cantabrian ports may break. In the spring of 1937, Franco knew, moreover, by their privileged contacts with the Vatican, the Basque nationalists had sought the mediation of the Pope to get a cessation of hostilities, without the government or other forces settled in the controlled territory Republic.
controlled by the Republic "? By then, the government of Largo Caballero could boast little more than control the central region of Andalusia and the Levant. Catalonia was presided over by a shadow government that ruled more than when he left the CNT, and the Basque Country, Asturias, Santander and ruled by governments that had not been legitimized in the polls and claimed in Taifa formulas without ever recognize of all legal government authority. Republican Spain had authority only in the center and east.
To recover, it has intervened in Barcelona in May 1937 after libertarian units on the one hand, and the Communists and Catalan nationalists, on the other, clashed in a bloody week that left hundreds dead in the streets and the morale of the Catalan rearguard on the floor.
After the crisis of disastrous government of Largo Caballero, Juan Manuel Negrin Azaña appointed President of the Council of Ministers, and Indalecio Prieto, Minister of Defense. They decided to deliver to Colonel Vicente Rojo responsibility for military operations.
Red, credited as the best Republican military, launched a new organization of his army around a central idea, the creation of a military maneuver that was able to move disciplined in large-scale actions that needed expertise and a great workout. To move large masses of men, not militant enough value. And developed a war plan that was marked by the idea of \u200b\u200bachieving decisive victories.
's army maneuver is created around the international brigades and units of V Regiment born, the germ of the Communist army. Red felt no personal or ideological sympathy for the communists, but had struggled with them in the siege of Madrid and confident in their discipline and loyalty in combat.
That choice created some suspicion among other Republican control. Not only between controls. Framed units where socialists and Republicans, to say nothing of the anarchists during the war feel a growing hostility towards the men from the V Regiment.
The first major test for the Army's germ maneuver was the battle of Brunete, conceived by Red with two goals in a very different scope: the first, the more limited, distract the troops were getting, slowly but systematic yield strength in the north. Indalecio Prieto considered that, in addition to the industrial wealth is concentrated, there were the best fighters Republicans, aware Asturian miners and industrial workers Basque militant anarchist, socialist and communist.
The second objective was powerful Red: cut army supply lines and isolate Franco troops besieging Madrid in a big bag he could be annihilated.
His aim was ambitious. This was to give a decisive battle that changed the course of the war for the Republic. In his optimistic view, the plan had many reasonable elements: a mid-1937, the Republic was not in a much weaker material against its enemies, because the Soviet supplies of arms had contributed substantial material and good quality as related to aircraft Hunting and tanks.
Brunete was a failure. Ended without any of the two sides could claim a conclusive victory, but Republicans lost 25,000 units of its best men for 10,000 of the Franco regime. When the fighting died down, Franco, who had to move some of its troops from the north to attend the match, returned to his place of origin and stabilized the front in the center.
What went wrong? The army itself. Shock divisions had been sent by men on charisma and courage, but lacking in military training. Modesto, Lister or Tagüeña had come to command large units because they formed part of the first flood of volunteers who covered the collapse of the republican army. Some of them had to use non-commissioned officer courses at the Frunze Academy in the USSR, but none knew the most difficult tasks of the battle, how to move units, organizing supplies, how to deploy the guns, how to make decisions risky when they ran with success. Some of them, as the head of the division 46, the peasant, even he could read a map.
In August 1937, at the Battle of Brunete, became extinct many of the possibilities of the Republic of winning the war. That did not mean
that Franco had already won, because he was facing a strong enemy. Did not mean that it would take to go clean the rear of the conquered territories. It is not enough to recognize the ruthlessness of the leader to prove that his decisions were always aim to win the war. The sooner, because I could not be sure that the international situation will always be favorable, as much as the Non-Intervention Committee will play in his favor.
The year 1937 was fulfilled the worst predictions for the Republic. Further attempts to Red, as the Belchite, failed and collapsed the north face of the worst ways: the battalions of the PNV were responsible for heavy industry fell Vizcaya intact in the hands of Franco. Those same battalions surrendered in Santoña through negotiations conducted behind the Negrin government. The Republic lost an army of 100,000 men, and Franco won ability to move to the 100,000 that was committed there.
Franco has since designed a new plan of assault on Madrid, the city he considered treasonous and was conceived as the soul of the Republican resistance. The plan of this attack was to attack from the northeast, from Guadalajara, with all the huge mass of maneuver that had been released since the fall of the last redoubts Asturias.
The Republican staff sensed that maneuver, and Vicente Rojo, according to the chief minister, Juan Negrin, developed a plan of great style that was able to frustrate and also allow him to regain the military initiative.
Between late December 1937 and early 1938, again switching the army was responsible for the action, and attacked Teruel. He did it very effectively in an early stage. It was a military and moral victory, because Teruel became the first capital of the province the Republic throughout the war won. But the rebel units were not sensible punishment. The Republic gained territory and moral. Nothing more.
That defeat, which was limited, challenged Franco's need to choose between two possibilities. The first, to stabilize the front and continue with their plans of attack on Madrid, the second to react and recover lost ground. He chose the latter.
If Franco had chosen to emphasize its assault on Madrid at that time would have encountered a republican army in the central region still had very hardened units to a defensive war, which had continued with the training of their soldiers and who had not worn since the battle of Brunete. Those were the same conditions that had to rely in making their plans for Madrid prior to the loss of Teruel. But after this defeat, the army of Republican maneuver was better off for having violated his rear.
His plan was more ambitious than expected, regained ground around Teruel, and since then, taking advantage of the excellent material supply situation of German and Italian and its great advantage able to maneuver units, rushed to the coast and won from the enemy zone in two, leaving the way battered army that opposed him. Vinaroz troops arrived and took a part of Catalonia. Colonel Yagüe Lérida seized, asserting an excellent platform to attack by foothills of the Pyrenees. The decision, viewed the results, was excellent. It should discuss whether the alternative would have been better, but it is doubtful seeing results.
Franco's generals were practically won the war since that time. But Franco, no. Since his staff is urged to a hitherto unseen insistence that attack in the north of Catalonia to end the resistance in the most industrialized region of the Republic and to isolate it entirely to France, ending once with smuggling of arms when the border was closed or the massive transfer of supplies when it opened.
Franco rejected the option. A new decision debatable. But you had your reasons, powerful reasons to take: in March 1938, several meetings of the General Staff of the French Army to assess whether or not to enter the war in Spain. The Italian and German troops who accompanied Franco in France provoked a rational suspicion. The policy of appeasement of Hitler imposed on the French by the British Government or its political reassuring nor his military to the danger of a new European war. And the possible arrival of German and Italian troops to the border could be seen from Paris as a serious hazard.
Franco knew of these meetings. And even knew the outcome, favorable to their interests, settled the option of continuing the war near the French border to avoid giving the slightest reason to France for an intervention that would have been catastrophic for their cause.
was a decision, again, with a strong political character, which forced him to rethink the decision to attack Madrid recurring or continuing the war by other means. And throw on Valencia chose to yield to the capital due to lack of food and war supplies.
That offensive ended with a resounding failure. It was a battle to win the Republican Army of the Centre, leaving the units commanded by Garcia Valiño in positions from which they could look Sagunto, but could not advance. On July 24, General Matallana, a friend of Red and one of the best military staff of the Republican side had achieved victory for his most valuable weapons in the entire war.
The next day, Red ordered, Negrin is accredited, that army troops will spend the Ebro move again, in its conception, there were two possible objectives. The short range was to distract the Franco offensive against Valencia, which already was unnecessary. The long, break communication between the armies of the north and east. A plan that was, given the available power, truly delusional.
Both first months of fighting have served only to dead and wasting ammunition. Franco made his famous remark: I do not understand. I have the best of the Red Army at bay in 35 km. His intention was clear: to exterminate, to cost out. Again, a questionable choice. But no more questionable than his opponent. Why are hardened to maintain Republican control of extermination that fight? He could have decided to withdraw across the river and prevent wear of the military. Not done.
The two armies wore so brutal. But who that was more suited him to the rebels, who bombarded the positions pleasure covered in an overwhelming Republican air superiority and artillery. Negrin and Red, however, ordered to go over the river to save his best army. And the Republican chief of staff was unsuccessful calls to put in an offensive launched from Valencia to distract the enemy. General Matallana tried, but with little momentum and any chance of success. I had no ability to act on the offensive.
In September 1938 a commitment was signed in Munich, which France and England gave free rein to Germany to annex part of Czechoslovakia. The Republic could give and to bury their ability to raise the political circumstances international. Since there were only two possible policies: to buy time until the outbreak of war in Europe or to attempt a negotiation, aided by European powers to seek a peace that had the lowest possible human cost. President Manuel Azana saw only feasible solution, as opposed to that advocated by Negrin, supported by his chief of staff, Vicente Rojo, to resist to force the enemy to negotiate. None of the options could be put to the test by the obstinacy of Franco.
Munich ended in military history of the Civil War. Although not the stories involving the military. The differences, suspicion, resentment, had grown both on the Republican side announced that the defeat could only enlarge. The negotiation was impossible in a Franco grown thanks to the Nazi-fascist support. Resistance at all costs the Communists and hawking the Negrin government could not continue, because the army had been exhausted maneuver in the Ebro after accepting a pulse useless following the strategy to achieve decisive victories.
And the army of the center, commanded by Miaja, was divided in line with the political disintegration of the Republican forces disintegrated and discouraged, and was preparing for the final internal confrontation. The battle of Catalonia was only the latest chapter in an inevitable military defeat. And the coup Married Julian Besteiro and Sigismund against the Negrin government, his most shameful act. Both tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a peace among military Franco, without retaliation.
Franco played his cards without making any demonstration of military genius, but always knowing what answer should be given to the different political situations in which they should move. The Republic, defended very unevenly by the various political, paid his unfavorable international position and serious internal disaffection. But his mistakes in the military.
War lasted three years because thousands of men loyal to the Republic had fought against a superior enemy. Hundreds of thousands of English had to leave their country. Many tens of thousands who were not able to suffer the cruel revenge of Franco, backed by a Church that had given the name of crusade for war and a very explicit theme: "Spain is Catholic or not." Republican army surrendered, was there anything that would prevent further killing Franco?
"The art of killing" (RBA), Jorge M. Reverte, goes on sale this coming week.
JORGE M. 15/03/2009 REVERTE
has been discussed almost everything. But maybe, when you meet 70 years after the Civil War's end, one aspect less treated as the purely military. A strike that became a long game of chess. A republican army fought better than expected. The author has investigated for years for his next book. This is your exclusive story, accompanied by photos unknown.
Copy of The Country
The April 1, 1939, General Franco announced the end of the war which he started, along with other soldiers, in July 1936. The statement did not mean winning the arrival of peace. A bleeding caused by three years of armed conflict were to follow him tens of thousands of executions committed by military courts no guarantees for the accused. The Civil War began as a coup, later became a confrontation between two great armies and ended with a wide slaughter.
all started when a fraction, the principal officers of the English army was agreed to strike a blow that would end the democratic state led by Manuel ana. That
military action that the conspirators thought complete in a few weeks with a clean would cost tens of thousands of people failed in its infancy. And this caused some disruption in the ranks coup that made a temporary alliance territories. Dead its natural leader, General Sanjurjo, at first, General Emilio Mola was as king of the north, while Gonzalo Queipo de Llano was the South. A third general, Francisco Franco, ruled over settled African forces in Ceuta and Melilla and the rest of the Moroccan protectorate. And that affected the way they implemented their first military career. While
Queipo de Llano was engaged in pacifying their territory police techniques, Mola and Franco agreed that the main strategic line of his plan was the conquest of Madrid. Each lashed out in his own way: Franco, from the south, ignored and evaded previous plans for approaching Despeñaperros African capital with its columns via Badajoz. Mola, who understood very soon the weak structure of Republican resistance in the north, due to the indecision of the Basque nationalists on their role in the conflict, took that occasion to attain one of the most important strategic victories of the rebels at all war: the isolation of Republican north the French border. He did so with little effort. But at the same time, their militias began requetés and garrison soldiers on Madrid. In the northern highlands fascist militias stopped him. A Franco, no, because his army was the only preparation for war, much the same style was primitive, typical of a colonial conflict. In places like Galicia and Asturias, local plans finalized rebels gradually connected with the largest contingents of Mola in Castilla y León, Aragón and Navarra. On the other side
loyal, the disarray that followed the failed coup was even greater. The army disappeared in a few days, and a barrage of multicolored militias took to the roads without any military planning effort. In the first weeks, the most militant activists who had volunteered to end the rebellion were killed by the hundreds to the passage of Legionnaires and regular, to take them out of the way using tactics involvement and unsophisticated weapons. The professional army that had remained loyal to the Republic were systematically disobeyed, tried many times by assemblies of soldiers and, in some cases, shot on the spot if the men under his command felt they had not fulfilled its duties effectively, that is, if they decided that they were traitors. In each area there was a different resistance phenomenon according to local political circumstances: the Catalan militia of the CNT, which had disdained to be with the political direction of Catalonia, struggled on his own with the intention of making revolution at home and export Aragon; Communists mounted their units considering the defense of the Republic of the Popular Front. The Socialists, as well, although with less efficiency.
During the first two months of the conflict, there was no clear direction of war on either side. Not even on the rebel side, where generals agreed on the basis of its strength and accomplishments. Franco, who was soon recognized as the most effective, managed to win, beating by hand Mola authority gave its near impunity advance on Madrid. With that and with the trump card of support from Hitler and Mussolini.
rebel General Franco was the first to achieve unity of action. His decision to release the palace policy Toledo contributed to the delay of the capture of Madrid, but assured the undisputed leadership of his movement. On 1 October he was appointed head of the state government to be built when the coup succeed.
Shortly after these dates, the socialist Francisco Largo Caballero got what he had until now seemed impossible: to create a Popular Front government were represented in almost all political and union advocates of the Republic. One of the first, if not the first tasks of this government was to launch a new military structure that was capable of defending the legal system. The time lost was Largo and his government to consider Madrid could not defend, because there was no time to implement effectively the new units fitted in mixed brigades were formed in Levante and La Mancha, and awaited the arrival of the weapons provided by the Soviet Union. Anarchists and communists
accepted, for better or worse grade, in the Council of Ministers decision of Largo: Madrid was left with a Defence Council headed by General Miaja and effective defense lines would be located on the banks of the Tagus .
However, when the battle of Madrid began, was produced within the Republic's first disobedience important: with the support of the Soviets, the Communists decided to he had to defend Madrid, despite the orders of Largo Caballero. The first brigade mixed with some operational capability, the command of Enrique Lister, appeared in the south of the city the day before the assault began. The international brigades did two days later. Long had to swallow the breach of his authority. Anarchists responded by moving their units, the army of Cipriano Mera, who was in La Mancha, Guadalajara, and the Durruti column, brought from the Aragon front in an initiative that took the government to challenge the hegemony of the communist military in front of the capital. General Sebastian Pozas, and direct subordinate Colonel Married Sigismund, in charge of the central area, had to endure the humiliation of seeing Madrid defended himself, and stick to the new circumstances.
Madrid was the last combat phase of the coup. It was an epic battle filled with images of heroism and condensation of the universal struggle between fascism and anti-fascism. But it remained a battle dominated by more primitive features. The use of aircraft and tanks had limited relevance to the side of the machine guns, artillery and infantry assaults on the body clean. While the soldiers were facing the Moorish mercenaries and legionnaires, men dressed as the army of Pancho Villa assassinated right-wing, without trial. Throughout Spain, a murderous fever spread. On one side, killing priests and nuns, shopkeepers and retired military personnel because the State had gone Democratic, the other, day laborers, teachers, poets and loyal military men, because the rebels wanted to build a new state nacionalcatólico.
assault
The failure of Franco in Madrid was followed by the first battle of some entity in the open: the Jarama. At that time, Franco was able to move units and divisions falling under significant mass use of artillery. His military authorities at that time was indisputable. The Republic could answer on the offensive with its new brigades, although lack of sufficient training and materiel. Best result obtained from the remittances of Soviet fighters to strike a balance in the air, which was favorable from the beginning, thanks to the German and Italian aid to the rebels. The Russian tanks, but poorly used by lack of experience of controls, had an important role in the outcome. A paper that was downgraded by the effectiveness of German anti-tank weapons.
That battle ended in a draw. It was a drain and left the two exhausted armies.
The following quote was in Guadalajara. A battle in which the CTV, the Italian expeditionary force, was a severe correction. His 40,000 men well armed, fed and clothed, were unable to break the Republican lines. And there are indications that Franco was not sorry that defeat came about. The Italian military had very explicit political direction of making war on their own, that is, to win for the Duce. Since I landed, without asking permission from his allies, in Cadiz during the month of December, Franco was unable to impose its authority over an army that was necessary to achieve victory, but could at any time, if he achieved hegemony in their side, very serious conditions impose on the political future of Spain. The action of Guadalajara was to take Madrid and sign a first-class propaganda both. In Franco's headquarters came to toast the result that had humiliated the fascist ally. In the Republicans are provided by the effectiveness of a man who had been instrumental in saving Madrid and now, had defeated the enemy in open field, Colonel Vicente Rojo. Established
authority, Franco never again suffer any setback that put into question the uniqueness of his command, though he had to impose by force their view of things that caused the crisis between the Falange and the Carlist to achieve necessary political unity, the party unique new state Ramon Serrano Suner designed for you. In the spring of 1937, Franco had become lord and master politician of the territories in his possession. The autonomy of the German Condor Legion did not threaten his leadership, because it only affected the way we use the units in combat.
was thereafter when he could exercise with all the force its military authority. He decided to end the northern front. Until then moved most of the Italian units and effective German artillery and air strikes, and began a bitter battle that enabled him to get, week after week, slowly and progressively, with the whole of the Cantabrian in the hands of the Republic.
This shift was decisive, although it required to set aside the first objective: Madrid. If he had taken the capital, would have overwhelmed its popularity. But his staff considered the almost impossible.
is arguable that the decision was wrong, but from the military standpoint, and with the possibility that the British policy of non-intervention could change, the liquidation of the northern front had many advantages for his side, with its conquest It would then control the mining areas and heavy industry, and allow him to unite their forces in one area, without having to back an army of 100,000 men from nearly all working-class areas with a high level of awareness. Although the Duke of Alba and other agents will be broadcasting from London, Paris and Rome assurances to the contrary, was not ruled out that there could be changes in the international political balance. And if British policy varied, and Franco had no power to influence it, blocking the Cantabrian ports may break. In the spring of 1937, Franco knew, moreover, by their privileged contacts with the Vatican, the Basque nationalists had sought the mediation of the Pope to get a cessation of hostilities, without the government or other forces settled in the controlled territory Republic.
controlled by the Republic "? By then, the government of Largo Caballero could boast little more than control the central region of Andalusia and the Levant. Catalonia was presided over by a shadow government that ruled more than when he left the CNT, and the Basque Country, Asturias, Santander and ruled by governments that had not been legitimized in the polls and claimed in Taifa formulas without ever recognize of all legal government authority. Republican Spain had authority only in the center and east.
To recover, it has intervened in Barcelona in May 1937 after libertarian units on the one hand, and the Communists and Catalan nationalists, on the other, clashed in a bloody week that left hundreds dead in the streets and the morale of the Catalan rearguard on the floor.
After the crisis of disastrous government of Largo Caballero, Juan Manuel Negrin Azaña appointed President of the Council of Ministers, and Indalecio Prieto, Minister of Defense. They decided to deliver to Colonel Vicente Rojo responsibility for military operations.
Red, credited as the best Republican military, launched a new organization of his army around a central idea, the creation of a military maneuver that was able to move disciplined in large-scale actions that needed expertise and a great workout. To move large masses of men, not militant enough value. And developed a war plan that was marked by the idea of \u200b\u200bachieving decisive victories.
's army maneuver is created around the international brigades and units of V Regiment born, the germ of the Communist army. Red felt no personal or ideological sympathy for the communists, but had struggled with them in the siege of Madrid and confident in their discipline and loyalty in combat.
That choice created some suspicion among other Republican control. Not only between controls. Framed units where socialists and Republicans, to say nothing of the anarchists during the war feel a growing hostility towards the men from the V Regiment.
The first major test for the Army's germ maneuver was the battle of Brunete, conceived by Red with two goals in a very different scope: the first, the more limited, distract the troops were getting, slowly but systematic yield strength in the north. Indalecio Prieto considered that, in addition to the industrial wealth is concentrated, there were the best fighters Republicans, aware Asturian miners and industrial workers Basque militant anarchist, socialist and communist.
The second objective was powerful Red: cut army supply lines and isolate Franco troops besieging Madrid in a big bag he could be annihilated.
His aim was ambitious. This was to give a decisive battle that changed the course of the war for the Republic. In his optimistic view, the plan had many reasonable elements: a mid-1937, the Republic was not in a much weaker material against its enemies, because the Soviet supplies of arms had contributed substantial material and good quality as related to aircraft Hunting and tanks.
Brunete was a failure. Ended without any of the two sides could claim a conclusive victory, but Republicans lost 25,000 units of its best men for 10,000 of the Franco regime. When the fighting died down, Franco, who had to move some of its troops from the north to attend the match, returned to his place of origin and stabilized the front in the center.
What went wrong? The army itself. Shock divisions had been sent by men on charisma and courage, but lacking in military training. Modesto, Lister or Tagüeña had come to command large units because they formed part of the first flood of volunteers who covered the collapse of the republican army. Some of them had to use non-commissioned officer courses at the Frunze Academy in the USSR, but none knew the most difficult tasks of the battle, how to move units, organizing supplies, how to deploy the guns, how to make decisions risky when they ran with success. Some of them, as the head of the division 46, the peasant, even he could read a map.
In August 1937, at the Battle of Brunete, became extinct many of the possibilities of the Republic of winning the war. That did not mean
that Franco had already won, because he was facing a strong enemy. Did not mean that it would take to go clean the rear of the conquered territories. It is not enough to recognize the ruthlessness of the leader to prove that his decisions were always aim to win the war. The sooner, because I could not be sure that the international situation will always be favorable, as much as the Non-Intervention Committee will play in his favor.
The year 1937 was fulfilled the worst predictions for the Republic. Further attempts to Red, as the Belchite, failed and collapsed the north face of the worst ways: the battalions of the PNV were responsible for heavy industry fell Vizcaya intact in the hands of Franco. Those same battalions surrendered in Santoña through negotiations conducted behind the Negrin government. The Republic lost an army of 100,000 men, and Franco won ability to move to the 100,000 that was committed there.
Franco has since designed a new plan of assault on Madrid, the city he considered treasonous and was conceived as the soul of the Republican resistance. The plan of this attack was to attack from the northeast, from Guadalajara, with all the huge mass of maneuver that had been released since the fall of the last redoubts Asturias.
The Republican staff sensed that maneuver, and Vicente Rojo, according to the chief minister, Juan Negrin, developed a plan of great style that was able to frustrate and also allow him to regain the military initiative.
Between late December 1937 and early 1938, again switching the army was responsible for the action, and attacked Teruel. He did it very effectively in an early stage. It was a military and moral victory, because Teruel became the first capital of the province the Republic throughout the war won. But the rebel units were not sensible punishment. The Republic gained territory and moral. Nothing more.
That defeat, which was limited, challenged Franco's need to choose between two possibilities. The first, to stabilize the front and continue with their plans of attack on Madrid, the second to react and recover lost ground. He chose the latter.
If Franco had chosen to emphasize its assault on Madrid at that time would have encountered a republican army in the central region still had very hardened units to a defensive war, which had continued with the training of their soldiers and who had not worn since the battle of Brunete. Those were the same conditions that had to rely in making their plans for Madrid prior to the loss of Teruel. But after this defeat, the army of Republican maneuver was better off for having violated his rear.
His plan was more ambitious than expected, regained ground around Teruel, and since then, taking advantage of the excellent material supply situation of German and Italian and its great advantage able to maneuver units, rushed to the coast and won from the enemy zone in two, leaving the way battered army that opposed him. Vinaroz troops arrived and took a part of Catalonia. Colonel Yagüe Lérida seized, asserting an excellent platform to attack by foothills of the Pyrenees. The decision, viewed the results, was excellent. It should discuss whether the alternative would have been better, but it is doubtful seeing results.
Franco's generals were practically won the war since that time. But Franco, no. Since his staff is urged to a hitherto unseen insistence that attack in the north of Catalonia to end the resistance in the most industrialized region of the Republic and to isolate it entirely to France, ending once with smuggling of arms when the border was closed or the massive transfer of supplies when it opened.
Franco rejected the option. A new decision debatable. But you had your reasons, powerful reasons to take: in March 1938, several meetings of the General Staff of the French Army to assess whether or not to enter the war in Spain. The Italian and German troops who accompanied Franco in France provoked a rational suspicion. The policy of appeasement of Hitler imposed on the French by the British Government or its political reassuring nor his military to the danger of a new European war. And the possible arrival of German and Italian troops to the border could be seen from Paris as a serious hazard.
Franco knew of these meetings. And even knew the outcome, favorable to their interests, settled the option of continuing the war near the French border to avoid giving the slightest reason to France for an intervention that would have been catastrophic for their cause.
was a decision, again, with a strong political character, which forced him to rethink the decision to attack Madrid recurring or continuing the war by other means. And throw on Valencia chose to yield to the capital due to lack of food and war supplies.
That offensive ended with a resounding failure. It was a battle to win the Republican Army of the Centre, leaving the units commanded by Garcia Valiño in positions from which they could look Sagunto, but could not advance. On July 24, General Matallana, a friend of Red and one of the best military staff of the Republican side had achieved victory for his most valuable weapons in the entire war.
The next day, Red ordered, Negrin is accredited, that army troops will spend the Ebro move again, in its conception, there were two possible objectives. The short range was to distract the Franco offensive against Valencia, which already was unnecessary. The long, break communication between the armies of the north and east. A plan that was, given the available power, truly delusional.
Both first months of fighting have served only to dead and wasting ammunition. Franco made his famous remark: I do not understand. I have the best of the Red Army at bay in 35 km. His intention was clear: to exterminate, to cost out. Again, a questionable choice. But no more questionable than his opponent. Why are hardened to maintain Republican control of extermination that fight? He could have decided to withdraw across the river and prevent wear of the military. Not done.
The two armies wore so brutal. But who that was more suited him to the rebels, who bombarded the positions pleasure covered in an overwhelming Republican air superiority and artillery. Negrin and Red, however, ordered to go over the river to save his best army. And the Republican chief of staff was unsuccessful calls to put in an offensive launched from Valencia to distract the enemy. General Matallana tried, but with little momentum and any chance of success. I had no ability to act on the offensive.
In September 1938 a commitment was signed in Munich, which France and England gave free rein to Germany to annex part of Czechoslovakia. The Republic could give and to bury their ability to raise the political circumstances international. Since there were only two possible policies: to buy time until the outbreak of war in Europe or to attempt a negotiation, aided by European powers to seek a peace that had the lowest possible human cost. President Manuel Azana saw only feasible solution, as opposed to that advocated by Negrin, supported by his chief of staff, Vicente Rojo, to resist to force the enemy to negotiate. None of the options could be put to the test by the obstinacy of Franco.
Munich ended in military history of the Civil War. Although not the stories involving the military. The differences, suspicion, resentment, had grown both on the Republican side announced that the defeat could only enlarge. The negotiation was impossible in a Franco grown thanks to the Nazi-fascist support. Resistance at all costs the Communists and hawking the Negrin government could not continue, because the army had been exhausted maneuver in the Ebro after accepting a pulse useless following the strategy to achieve decisive victories.
And the army of the center, commanded by Miaja, was divided in line with the political disintegration of the Republican forces disintegrated and discouraged, and was preparing for the final internal confrontation. The battle of Catalonia was only the latest chapter in an inevitable military defeat. And the coup Married Julian Besteiro and Sigismund against the Negrin government, his most shameful act. Both tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a peace among military Franco, without retaliation.
Franco played his cards without making any demonstration of military genius, but always knowing what answer should be given to the different political situations in which they should move. The Republic, defended very unevenly by the various political, paid his unfavorable international position and serious internal disaffection. But his mistakes in the military.
War lasted three years because thousands of men loyal to the Republic had fought against a superior enemy. Hundreds of thousands of English had to leave their country. Many tens of thousands who were not able to suffer the cruel revenge of Franco, backed by a Church that had given the name of crusade for war and a very explicit theme: "Spain is Catholic or not." Republican army surrendered, was there anything that would prevent further killing Franco?
"The art of killing" (RBA), Jorge M. Reverte, goes on sale this coming week.
